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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Resporulent,

vs.

Case No.

CHARLES R. KNOWLES,

12038

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was placed on probation following his convietion for o):)taining money under false pretenses, which
probation was revoked December 17, 1969.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A hearing on an order to show cause why a;ppelilant's
probation should not be revoked resulted in appeHant's
commitment to the Utah Starte Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks thiis Count to affirm the order of :the
District Court revoking appellant's probation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent generally agrees wifh the facts as set forth

2

in appellant's statement (Brief, a;t 2-5), but wishes to set
forth the following items:
Appellant claims that Deputy Hanks told
lant's wife to "remove from the house any stdlen property"
( BI'ief, at 3), but the transcript indicates aU the deputy
said was ithat "Capt. Hayward and some deputies were
coming out to the house" (R. at 63).
1.

2. At page 4 of his brief, appellant claims no probable
cause exiisted for the search of the truck his wife was driving, and that there was an iHega:l seizure of certain items
therein. The official transcript indicwtes the items seized
were in plain viiew (R. 66), and that Mrs. Knowles consented to the taking of the items (R. 68).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD AUTHORITY TO
REHEAR DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL AND TO MODIFY ITS EARLIER
ORDER.
On June 10, 1970, respondent moved this Court to
make the minute entry of the 'trial court of
29, 1968,
a part of the official record in this case.
The entry shows the trial court reconsidered defendant's motion for a new trial (which irt had granted: R.
46), and denied the same, recalling its earlier order granting the motion.

Appellant argues rthat rthe trial court lacked power to
modify or revoke an order granting a new tria:l, relying on
Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, 113 P. 1023 (1911).
In that case, this Cou11t recogndzed and followed the
Ca:lifornria rule that an order granting a new trial cannot
usuaHy be modified. Appellant faHs to mention 1Jhe exception to the general rule he seeks to invoke : tif sucih an
order has been prematurely or irradverltently entered, it

may be set a&ide on a proper showing. Id. at 387, citing:
Holtum v. Greif, 144 Ca:l. 521, 78 Pac. 11.
More recently this Court held that Utah Rules of CiVil
Procedure 7 (b) permits Urta:h judges to modify an order
granting a new :trial, although i1t did not
the modifiableness of an order granted pu11suant to a properly noticed and heard mOltion. National Farmers Union Property
and Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Uta:h 2d 7, 11, 286 P. 2d
249 (1955).
In Drury V. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P. 2d 662
(1966), this Court said:

"[W]e also recogniize that there may be situations where an order denying or granting a new
trial may have been made by ioodver:tance or mistake, or where 1Jhere was some irregularity in connection wit:Jh the obtaining or granting of the order,
in which insrtance the courrt could of course aot to
correct any such mistake or irregularity." Id. at
77.
1

The record indicates 1fua;t ,1Jhe iStJate was not represented

at the hearing on defendanlt's motion (R. 46). In a letter
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to the Court, State's Attorney Haycock indicated the circumstances resulting in his failure to appear at the hearing
(R. 47-48). It would appear that the irregularity resulting
in the failure of the State to be present when defendant's
motion was first heard was of a nature as to allow rehearing of the motion, as contemplated in the Drury case, supra.
Respondent submits that appellant's contentions as to
the modification of the ·order for new trial are without
merit, and that therefore the lower court had jurisdiction
to hear the probation revocation matter.
POINT II.
EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS
NOT OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
Appellant argues that the items seized from a truck
driven by his wife were a result of an illegal search and
seizure, and that his wife should have been advised of her
rights (Brief, at 8).
However, no attempt was made to use the evidence
seized against appellant's wife and the record clearly discloses that she consented to the seizure ( R. 68) .
This Court has never considered the ability of a wife
to consent to a search which results in the seizure of evidence used against her husband at trial. Those jurisdictions that have dealt with the issue uniformly hold that
a joint possessor can consent to such a taking. See, State
v. Kennedy, 80 N. M. 152, 452 P. 2d 486 (1969).

6
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the volurutary
consent of an owner or possessor of a premises renders the
search and seizure rea:sonable even though another person
claims the
protection. State v. Gonzales, 438
P. 2d 897 (1968); reh. denied: April 16, 1968.
In a oose whose facits closely parallel instant appeal,
the Oklahoma Oom1t held evidence dbtained from the searoh
of the family car driven by the 1wife, pursuant to her consent, admirssible againsrt the husband ait tdal. Camp v.
State, 70 Okla. Cr. 68, 104 P. 2d 572 (1940).
1

Respondent subm1ts that since Mrs. Knowles ha;d possession and control over the items seized, she could, and
did, submit to the seizure orf the items and no constbitutional
defects are present in their admission at the hearing.
POINT III.
PROBATION REVOCATION HEARINGS ARE
NOT SUBJECT TO ALL THE DUE PROCESS
SAFEGUARDS OF A CRIMINAL TRIAL.
Appellant's remairuing contentions aire bas i ca ,1 iJ. y
grounded in his view that all the due process .guarantees
of crimi:nra!l trials apply to probation revocaJtion hearings.
Primary reliance 1is placed on this Court's ruling in State
V. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P. 2d 970 (1944) (Brief, at

10).

The following language of this Court, from Velasquez
V. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 443 P. 2d 1020 (1968), seems
dispositive of this contention:
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"The appellant appears to proceed upon rthe
erroneous premise that on a hearing for violation
of probation a person is entitled to ithe same protections the law affords one nE:lwly accused of an
offense and before he is found guillty !thereof. In
the case of State v. Bonza, 106 Uta:h 553, 150 P. 2d
970, and also in t!he more recent one of Blaine v.
Beckstead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 347 P. 2d 554, this court
dealt with the question of revocation of probation,
indicating that when a person has been found gui'lty
of an offense and sentenced, he is
quite a different status rthan he is before conviction. He 'is deemed
to be actually serving tthe sentence imposed, but
under prescribed conditions which he has agreed to
comply with. He is certainly not entitled 'to al'l of
the protections accorded one accused otf crime in the
first instance. If he could insist on those rights,
from the incipient protections relating to ,arrest,
through the presumption of innocence, the right of
counsel and trial by jury, the court might as well
turn him completely free in the first place and not
bother about probation. Such requirement would
tend to destroy the system which has proved '50
useful and beneficia'l in pendlogy, because judg'€s
would be very reluctant to grant probation." Id.
at 231.
The question to be determined fa such hearings is
whether or not the conduct of the defendant is in violation
of the terms and conditions of his probation agreement
with the Court. State v. Bonza, op. cit., at 558. As noted
in Vel,asquez, judges wou ld be reluctant to grant probation
if they would be held to the same standards in revoking
probation as in criminal trials.
1

Trial judges must be permitted to examine the totality
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of oircumsitances in determining whether to revoke a defendant's probation. The testimony of a police officer as
to the worth of the items seiz.ed and the fact thaJt they were
stolen represents an aJttempt of :the court, not as appeHant
seems to feel, to determine rthe pmbationer's gui1t of ttheft,
but to ascertain whether or not his conduct has been
as to warrant revoking hiis status as a probationer.
CONCLUSION

Respondent respectfully asks rthis Court to affirm the
action of the tria:l court in revoking appeHanJt's probation.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney Genera;}

Attorneys for Respondent

